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THE CONCEPT OF "JOINT ENTERPRISE" IN
AUTOMOBILE INJURY CASES
The dominating principle in a joint venture or enterprise between
persons riding together as occupants in an automobile is the control
or right of control which each party is capable of exercising over the
other member or members of the undertaking. According to one text-
writer, "A joint enterprise by two persons riding in an automobile along
a public highway, the engagement in which will impute the negligence
in operating the automobile of one of the persons, who is the driver,
to the other person, must be a joint enterprise in controlling, directing,
and governing the operation and running of the automobile, and not
merely a joint interest in the objects and purposes of the trip."' The
degree of control necessary, what constitutes such control, the various
facts indicating a joint adventure, and other like points have been
,treated in various ways by the several jurisdictions in this country;
but the majority rule requires some control by each occupant of the
automobile over the driver in order to have a joint venture between
such parties. The concept of joint enterprise so as to impute the negli-
gence of the driver of an automobile to the occupants, the idea of host-
guest relation, and the liability of joint entrepreneurs to each other are
all concerned with the essential element of control. In a recent Minne-
sota case, where several parties went on a hunting trip, each contrib-
uting to a common fund for all expenses, and where "each fellow had
an equal voice in the running of the trip," there was a joint enterprise
because each of the persons had a community of interest in the pur-
poses and objects of the undertaking and an equal right in the con-
trol and management. 2 The negligence of the driver is to be imputed to
the other member or members of the joint enterprise where two or
more persons have a common purpose in driving an automobile,
whether for business or pleasure, and its operation is under their joint
control.3
The courts emphasize lack of control over the driver in determining
that no joint venture exists between the parties, but they also point to
a number of different reasons, in combination or separately, for say-
ing that there is no joint venture. This is apparent from the various
fact situations and opinions on which the courts' decisions are based.
Where a husband and wife were moving to another city, and there was
no evidence that the journey was undertaken merely at the request of
the wife or any fact showing that the husband was acting as her agent,
or that they were jointly operating or controlling the movements of
5 BERRY, LAW o ArromoBInEs (7th ed. 1935) § 5158.
2Ruth v. Hutchinson, 296 N.W. 136 (Minn. 1941).
3 Counts v. Thomas, 63 S.W. (2nd) 416 (Mo. App. 1933).
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the car at the time of the accident, it was held that there was nothing
to indicate a joint enterprise.4 In another case the plaintiff was injured
while riding in defendant's car operated by defendant's son. The
plaintiff, who was going to see a person respecting a loan for defendant,
suggested traveling a certain street. Upon these facts, the court held
that there was no joint enterprise, because the joint interest of the
parties on a trip was not considered enough to constitute the trip a
joint venture. The court stated that to constitute joint enterprise in
such a case there must be not only joint or community interest, but
also an equal right, express or implied, to direct and control the man-
agement and movement of the car.5 Similarly, when plaintiff, defendant
and another were riding in defendant's roadster to inspect mining
property in which a fourth party was interested, and when there was
no buying or selling of the property, and no money or other valuable
thing passed to defendant from either of the other men by way of com-
pensation, although the plaintiff acted as a guide to help defendant
find the property, the court said that there was no indicia of joint ven-
ture shown by the excursion, and plaintiff was a mere passenger. 6
Where a plaintiff was injured while riding in his superintendant's auto-
mobile on his way' to do some work, the Louisiana court held that
there was no joint enterprise, stating that such a defense may be inter-
posed only when each occupant of the automobile has as much interest
in the purpose of the enterprise as the other, and when each has a right
to control the operation of the automobile. 7 The driver's negligence
will not be imputed to a passenger not the owner of the automobile,
having no control over the operation of the car, and no authority to
direct the driver.8
The act on the part of an occupant of merely pointing out a cer-
tain way to proceed is not sufficient to constitute a joint venture between
the driver and the occupant. To constitute a joint undertaking so as
to impute the negligence of the driver to occupants of the automobile,
it is not sufficient merely that the occupant indicate to the driver the
route he wishes to travel, or the places to which he wishes to go,
even though in this respect there exists between them a common enter-
prise of riding together. The circumstances must be such as to show
that the occupant and driver together had such control and direction
over the automobile as to be practically in the joint or common pos-
session of itY That the driver and the occupant be practically in joint
or common possession of the car is more than the usual requirement
4Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 690 (1921).5 Stearns v. Lindow, 63 App. D.C. 134, 70 F. (2nd) 738 (1934).6 Crawford v. Herzog, 3 Cal. App. (2nd) 705, 40 P. (2nd) 954 (1935).
7Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369 (La. App. 1934).8 Applebee v. Ross, 48 S.W. (2nd) 900 (Mo. 1932).
9 Bryant v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164 Pac. 385 (1917).
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to show control. Where the plaintiff went with the defendant in
defendant's automobile across the country, each having a separate
interest in so doing, and plaintiff was only to pay her personal expenses
while defendant was to pay all driving expenses, there was held to be
no joint enterprise. The mutuality of control and direction over the
operation of the car, vital to the establishment of a joint venture, was
lacking. The mere presence of mutual or joint interest is not suffi-
cient.1o Again, where there was an understanding that the plaintiff
was to pay a part of the expenses and do a part of the driving, but the
control and management of the automobile were left to the defendant
owner, the court held that to constitute a joint enterprise between a
passenger and driver of an automobile, there must be such a com-
munity of interest in the operation as to give each an equal right of
control." An injury resulting from an accident occurring while riding
toward a destination in pursuance of an agreement to pay a part of
the operating expenses, so that all the parties could obtain transporta-
tion at the lowest possible expense, did not necessarily occur during a
joint venture. The payment of a portion of the expenses of a journey
does not of itself prove an agreement of joint venture; the essential
elements of a joint venture are a contract, a common purpose, a com-
munity of interest, and an equal right to a voice, accompanied by an
equal right of control.'2 There was held to be no joint enterprise
where a party was killed while riding in an automobile belonging to
and driven by defendant's decedent, when the occupant was in the
habit of riding home from work with the driver, but made no con-
tribution toward the upkeep of the car, never drove it, and exercised
no control over the driver. There must be a finding that the occupant
had a "voice in the control, management or direction of the vehicle."'1
Several people riding together in defendant's car to help put out a fire
in a neighbor's buildings were held not to be engaged in a joint enter-
prise. This was a host-guest relation; the relation of joint adventurers
does not arise out of social relations, but grows out of a financial or
business enterprise, and springs from contract.' 4
In a late Michigan case, where the plaintiff offered to buy the
necessary gasoline, bought the defendant driver a dinner, and indi-
cated the way to travel on a fishing trip, the court held that the plain-
tiff could not recover for injuries sustained in an accident occurring
when the driver lost control of the car, because the parties were engaged
in a joint venture or enterprise for pleasure and recreation, undertaken
:0 Mayer v. Puryear, 115 F. (2nd) 675 (C.C.A. 4th, 1940).
1 Zeigler v. Ryan, 65 S.D. 110, 271 N.W. 767 (1937).
'2 Moen v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 101 P. (2nd) 323
(Wash. 1940).
13 johnson v. Hetrick, 300 Pa. 225, 150 Atl. 477 (1930).
14 Sommerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis. 163, 223 N.W. 408 (1929).
1941] NOTES
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
for the mutual benefit and satisfaction of each of the parties. 15 Here
it seems that the court entirely overlooked the essential element of
control. However, this jurisdiction has apparently followed the major-
ity rule requiring control over the driver to constitute a joint enterprise
so that the negligence of the driver will be imputed to an occupant,
for in an earlier case it was said that to constitute a joint enterprise
between a passenger and the driver of an automobile, within the mean-
ing of the law of negligence, there must be such a community of inter-
est in its operation as to give to each an equal right of control. 6
Another jurisdiction has held that a joint venture existed on the
grounds that the plaintiff jointly contributed to the expenses of a
hunting trip undertaken with defendant in defendant's automobile.' 7
And where the plaintiff went on a pleasure trip with defendant driver
in defendant's car, and plaintiff was to pay for the gasoline for
the automobile, and for her own expenses, these facts were held
to constitute a joint enterprise, as an undertaking for the mutual
benefit or pleasure of the parties.' s The cases which hold that
there is a joint adventure without making a finding that the occupant
had a right to control the operation of the automobile or the driver in
some way, and without mentioning the element of control at all, are
clearly in the minority.
Closely interrelated with the idea of what constitutes a joint ven-
ture between occupants of an automobile so that the driver's negli-
gence is imputable to the other occupants, is the consideration of an
automobile guest. Where a plaintiff was injured while riding in an
automobile which was being demonstrated to the plaintiff by the
defendant, the court said, "A guest is one who accepts the hospitality
of the driver, takes a ride either for his own pleasure or his own
business, and makes no return nor confers any benefit upon the driver
of the car, other than the mere pleasure of his company."1 9 This seems
to indicate that the fact of social benefit between the parties is not
sufficient to create a joint enterprise. That parties are engaged in a
common pleasure enterprise will not prevent the one riding with the
driver from being a "guest" passenger. 0 Where the plaintiff and
defendant were business women and personal friends, and the defend-
ant invited plaintiff to take a trip with her to a nearby town to see a
friend of defendant who was opening a store, it was held that this was
not a joint enterprise for a common purpose, plaintiff having accepted
an invitation from defendant to ride in the car. The plaintiff was
15 Johnson v. Fischer, 292 Mich. 78, 290 N.W. 334 (1940).
16 Farthing v. HepinstalI, 243 Mich. 380, 220 N.W. 708 (1928).
17 Lloyd v. Mowery, 158 Wash. 341, 290 Pac. 710 (1930).
28 O'Brien v. Woldson, 149 Wash. 192, 270 Pac. 304 (1928).
'9 Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 Pac. 841 (1930).
20 Redwing v. Moncravie, 131 Cal. App. 569, 21 P. (2nd) 986 (1933).
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defendant's guest.21 There was held to be no joint venture when a girl
went with her escort and his friend to get refreshments during a dance
intermission. She was considered to be merely a guest of the driver,
because there was no preparation for the trip as a joint venture, and
there was no purpose of proceeding to a fixed destination to participate
in and to consummate an agreed and common purpose.2 2 In a case
where the plaintiff was invited by the driver to make a 335-mile trip,
at no expense to the plaintiff, and where there was no agreement as to
plaintiff's doing part of the driving, it was held that there was no
joint enterprise. The plaintiff was considered the driver's guest.25
Where there is nothing in the nature of a mutual agency existing
between the parties, or any joint or common obligation on their part,
and no contractual relationship between plaintiff and the defendant,
nor any joint financial interest in the trip between the parties, there is
no joint enterprise, but a gratuitous guest relation. 24 The control ele-
ment is clearly indicated in a case in which the deceased was killed in
an automobile accident while on a fishing trip with defendant motorist.
The deceased purchased gasoline, and there was evidence that the
men were to pay their equal shares of expenses on the trip. It was
held that deceased was a guest of the defendant and that the question
of joint enterprise was not for the jury.25 If the driver invites others
to accompany him on a trip, and he has sole charge and control of
the automobile and is the only person operating it on the entire trip,
the others are his guests, and the negligence of the driver cannot be
imputed to a guest riding in the car who has no control or right to
control the operation thereof.28 Also, a person riding with the driver
of an automobile on a week-end trip, who took no part in the opera-
tion and had no control over the automobile at any time, was the
defendant driver's guest.2 7 There is a host-guest relation even where
there is a tacit understanding that the parties to a trip will equally
share the cost of the gasoline necessary for the trip. To constitute
a joint venture the relationship must possess the element of equal right
to a voice in the manner of performance of the enterprise, dfid thus
each party must have an equal right of control over the agencies used.28
It is interesting to note the consideration of this subject in the
states which have statutes prohibiting recovery by an automobile guest
unless the driver is shown to be guilty of what amounts to gross negli-
21 Lawson v. Nossek, 15 La. App. 207, 130 So. 669 (1930).22 Denham v. Taylor, 19 La. App. 814, 132 So. 372 (1931).
23Lea v. Gentry, 167 Tenn. 614, 73 S.W. (2nd) 170 (1934).
24 Fischbach v. Wanta, 212 Wis. 638, 250 N.W. 387 (1933).
25 Barnard v. Heather, 135 Nebr. 513, 282 N.W. 534 (1938).26 Schwind v. Gibson, 220 Ia. 377, 260 N.W. 853 (1935).2 7 Kaplan v. Kaplan, 213 Ia. 646, 239 N.W. 682 (1931).2 8 Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash. (2nd) 347, 95 P. (2nd) 1043 (1939).
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gence. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. In Illinois,
if carriage confers only a benefit incident to hospitality, companion-
ship or the like, the passenger is a guest (within the meaning of a
statute prohibiting recovery by a guest unless wilful and wanton mis-
conduct on the part of the driver is shown to have contributed to the
plaintiff's injury) ;'9 but if the carriage tends to promote mutual inter-
ests of both the person carried and the driver, the passenger is not such
a guest.30 In a case where plaintiff was being driven by the defendant
to defendant's house to work as a laundress, a Connecticut court held
that "guest", within the statute barring recovery for injuries received
while being transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle,
does not include persons who are being transported for the mutual
benefit of both the passenger and operator or owner of the car.31
As the basis for imputing the negligence of the driver to the other
occupants of an automobile while on a joint enterprise, the majority
courts follow the theory that there must be a mutual agency, thereby
inferring the consequent control. As a necessary corollary to this, the
imputed negligence "must be in respect of a matter within the joint
enterprise."3 2 That his negligence be imputed to an occupant, the driver
of an automobile must be the agent of the occupant, as ascertained
by the joint enterprise relation.3 3 There was no joint enterprise in a
case where the facts showed nothing in the nature of a mutual agency
existing between the parties; such mutual agency is the characteristic
of the relation of joint adventurers. 34 The rule of joint enterprise in
negligence cases is founded on the law of principal and agent, and only
on this theory is the negligence of the driver imputable to a passenger.3 5
However, members of joint enterprises are allowed to recover from
another member on the basis of responsibility for negligence as arising
from a personal tort." It has been said that the doctrine of imputed
negligence will not be applied to allow a negligent joint adventurer "to
take refuge behind his own wrong. ' 37
VINCENT D. HENNESSEY, JR.
29 Smith-Hurd Stats., c. 95Y, § 58a (Ill. 1939).
30 Connett v. Winget, 374 Ill. 531, 30 N.E. (2nd) 1 (1940).
31 Kruy v. Smith, 108 Conn. 628, 144 At. 304 (1929).
32 See Note 1, supra.
33 Steudle v. Yellow and Checker Cab & Transfer Co., 287 Mich. 1, 282 N.W.
879 (1938).
34 See Note 14, supra.
35 See Note 16, supra.
36 McCombs v. Ellsberry, 337 Mo. 491, 85 S.W. (2nd) 135 (1935).
37 Note (1939) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 666.
Note (1934) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549.
